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PROBABILITY IN ETHICS
DAVID MCCARTHY
Ethics is mainly about what we ought to do, and about when one situation is better
than another. But facing uncertainty about the consequences of our actions, and
about how situations will evolve, is an all-pervasive feature of our condition. Should
this not be a central topic in ethical theory?
Probability is by far the best known tool for thinking about uncertainty, a well-
known aphorism telling us that it is the very guide to life. But despite important
exceptions, it is easy to get the impression that mainstream moral philosophy has
not been much concerned with probability.
This reflects what seems to be a natural division of labour. The most funda-
mental questions for ethical theory seem to arise in the absence of uncertainty. For
example, it seems hard to believe that the questions of whether it is better to give
priority to the worse off, and of whether we ought to favour our nearest and dearest,
have anything to do with uncertainty. Many influential discussions of these topics
never mention uncertainty.
Of course, once answers to these fundamental questions are in, we can try to
extend them to cases involving uncertainty. But ethical theorists may seem well
advised to hand over this task to others given how mathematical the various dis-
ciplines concerned with probability have become. Technically and philosophically
interesting as it may be, the extension of central ethical ideas to problems involving
probability seems to be outside the main business of ethical theory.
This article will argue for the opposite view. The major ethical problems to do
with probability involve very little mathematics to appreciate; many topics which
do not seem to have anything to do with probability are arguably all about proba-
bility; and thinking about various problems to do with probability can help us solve
analogous problems which do not involve probability, sometimes even revealing that
popular positions about such problems are incoherent.
Almost every topic discussed here could easily be given its own survey article,
and an adequate bibliography would exceed the space allotted for the whole chapter.
Positive positions are often argued for sketchily, many important positions on each
topic are neglected, and some major topics are not discussed at all.
Instead, the goal is to offer enough breadth to illustrate some ways in which
questions about probability run systematically throughout ethical theory, while in
places going into enough depth to articulate some surprising and potentially impor-
tant applications. In brief, what follows is much less a survey of or an argument for
particular positions than a plea for ethical theory to take probability more seriously.
Thanks to Alan Ha´jek and Kalle Mikkola for very helpful comments. Support was partially
provided by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, China (HKU 750012H).
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I said that ethics is largely about what we ought to do, and when one situation is
better than another. Some say that rationality is about these things as well. Given
that theories of rationality in the face of uncertainty are highly developed, it might
be thought that an appeal to these theories of rationality straightforwardly solves
ethical problems about probability.
This line of thought is importantly mistaken. First, Hume famously claimed that
it is not irrational for an agent to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of his finger. Nor would it be irrational for the agent to bring about the
destruction to avoid the scratching. But the destruction is neither better than the
scratching, nor better for the agent. And the agent surely ought not to bring about
the destruction. On at least one widely held view, therefore, ethics and rationality
are not about the same things.
Second, it is undeniable that contemporary theories of rationality are an indis-
pensable resource for thinking about ethics and probability. However, whether and
how to apply these theories to ethics is far from straightforward, and will be one of
the principal concerns of this chapter. Furthermore, in my view, at least, appeals
to rationality are almost always epiphenomenal. For example, suppose we have a
convincing argument for the claim that rational preferences have such and such a
structure. We could then try to claim that an evaluative relation like betterness
has to have that structure on the grounds that a rational agent can surely prefer
what’s better to what’s worse. However, it is almost always less committal and
more direct just to modify the original argument to make it apply directly to the
structure of the evaluative relation. Claims about rationality often have historical
priority over parallel claims about ethics, but I believe they do not have any kind
of important conceptual priority.
The chapter starts with four sections which discuss which probabilities are rele-
vant to ethics, establish terminology and rehearse expected utility theory. It then
turns to the evaluative question of when one situation is better than another, fo-
cusing on the question of when one distribution of goods is better than another.
Sections 5 and 6 discuss popular but I think inadequate approaches to this question.
These serve as a backdrop to a hugely important theorem due to Harsanyi [22] intro-
duced in section 7. Sections 8 to 16 discuss such things as the relationship between
Harsanyi’s theorem and utilitarianism; criticisms of Harsanyi’s premises and the
relationship of these criticisms to other distributive views such as egalitarianism,
the priority view, and concerns with fairness; the extension of Harsanyi’s theorem
to problems of population size; incommensurability; continuity; nonexpected util-
ity theory; evaluative measurement; and the question of what Harsanyi’s theorem
really shows about aggregation. These sections also list various open problems and
directions for further work. All of these topics have to do with probability.
One of the benefits of thinking about Harsanyi’s theorem is the way it helps us
organize our thinking about all sorts of fundamental evaluative questions. Section
17 will suggest that thinking about decision theory can have the same value in
thinking about fundamental normative questions, questions about what we ought
to do. With particular focus on probability, the remaining sections illustrate by
discussing what are arguably the three most important kinds of normative theo-
ries: act consequentialism, rule consequentialism or contractualism, and deontology
(these will be defined in section 3).
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The discussion aims to be self-contained. For those with a background in ethics
who would like to know more about how probability is involved, the chapter keeps
technicalities to a minimum. But the topic just cannot be addressed without a
certain amount of rigor, and passing acquaintance with expected utility theory and
decision theory will be helpful, though not strictly necessary. For those who know
about probability and would like to see how it applies to ethics, the chapter gives
brief guides to the relevant ethical debates. Such readers will recognize occasional
allusions to relatively sophisticated ideas to do with probability. For one thing is
clear: the questions about probability which ethics raises are profound, and are
surely best addressed by combining expertise.
1. Probabilities
One difficulty in thinking about probability in ethics is assessing when ethicists
need to be involved. Suppose we are told that some action will benefit many
but involves a small probability of harming a few. We might think it the job of
epistemologists, metaphysicians or philosophers of science to tell us what kind of
judgment ‘the probability is small’ expresses, what laws probabilities obey, and
what makes such a judgment correct. Ethicists need only ask whether we ought
to perform the action given that the probability of harm is small, and need not be
involved any earlier. However, the division of labor is unlikely to be so neat.
There are many conceptions of probability (see e.g. Ha´jek [17] for a survey).
This raises the question of which conception is most relevant to ethics, or whether
different conceptions are appropriate in different ethical contexts. One of the most
basic distinctions is between subjective and objective conceptions of probability,
and this distinction will enable us to illustrate many of the issues.
The best known subjective conception claims that the preferences of an ideally ra-
tional agent between uncertain prospects must satisfy various structural conditions
(Ramsey [60], Savage [65]). Suppose the agent also has a rich set of preferences.
Then Ramsey and Savage showed that there exists a unique function on events sat-
isfying the usual probability axioms (call it her subjective probability function) and
a function on outcomes (her utility function) such that: the agent weakly prefers
one prospect to another if and only if the former has at least as great expected
utility, as calculated by those functions.
Perhaps the most prominent objective conception of probability in the contem-
porary debate is the best-system analysis pioneered by Lewis. Lewis’s [36] original
best-system analysis of the laws of nature says that the laws are the theorems of the
best systematization of the world: the true theory which does best in terms of sim-
plicity and strength (or informativeness). To allow probabilistic laws in, Lewis [39]
introduced the idea of fit. The more likely the actual world is by the lights of the
theory, the better the fit of that theory. Theories are now judged according to how
well they do in terms of simplicity, strength, and fit. If some of the laws of the best
theory are probabilistic, those are what determine the objective probabilities.
Suppose we have to choose between subjective and objective conceptions for use
in ethics, understood along the lines just sketched.1 Which conception should it
be? Perhaps it depends on context: for example, subjective probabilities may be
1Neither the Ramsey-Savage story about subjective probabilities nor Lewis’s version of best-
system analysis has a hegemony. For surveys of alternative views about subjective probability,
see Gilboa [16], and for alternative best-system analyses, see Schwarz [70].
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appropriate for agent-evaluation (blame, responsibility etc.), but inappropriate in
other contexts. But let us fix the context by focussing on the most basic normative
question of what we ought to do.
Each conception has features we might find appealing. Objective probabilities
seem in some important sense to trump subjective probabilities. This is reflected in
the popular view that when an agent has beliefs about objective probabilities, ratio-
nality requires her to conform her subjective probabilities to those beliefs. This is
the basic idea behind the so-called principle principal of Lewis [38] (see Cusbert [7]
in this volume). But if objective probabilities do indeed trump subjective probabil-
ities, it may seem that what we ought to do depends on the objective probabilities,
not our subjective probabilities.
On the other hand, objective probabilities may be disappointingly sparse or
epistemically inaccessible. For example, best-systems analyses may make good
sense of the objective probability of radium atoms decaying or coins landing on
heads. But it is much less clear what best-systems analyses have to say about the
objective probability of events like a run on a particular bank next year, one-off
macro events involving chaotic systems. Such events may fail to have reasonably
determinate objective probabilities (compare Hoefer [27]), and even if they do, the
epistemology may be too difficult for the objective probabilities to be usefully action
guiding.
So perhaps we should instead say that what we ought to do depends at least in
part on our subjective probabilities. One option is to use subjective probabilities
exclusively; another is to use objective probabilities where available, and subjective
probabilities to fill in the gaps. But every view which makes significant use of
subjective probabilities faces at least two major problems.
First, the Ramsey-Savage story about subjective probabilities is a chapter in
the Humean story about rationality. But just as the Humean story refuses to
condemn the preference for the destruction of the whole world over the scratching
of a finger, the Ramsey-Savage story does not condemn subjective probabilities
which, to most people, are just as crazy. For example, provided her preferences are
appropriately structured, there is nothing in the Ramsey-Savage story to condemn
someone who thinks it highly likely the world will come to an end before teatime.
Such subjective probabilities will seem to many too irrational to have any bearing
on what we ought to do. But it is a major challenge to articulate a principled
account of which subjective probabilities should be excluded.
Second, as soon as we allow in subjective probabilities, we face questions of
whose and how. Whose subjective probabilities count in determining whether an
agent ought to perform some action – the agent’s, those of her potential victims or
beneficiaries, everyone’s? If the subjective probabilities of at least two people are
relevant, how should they be used? At least if we switch to the problem of evaluating
the uncertain prospects which actions result in, this is a longstanding problem in
welfare economics. The so-called ex post approach recommends first aggregating the
separate subjective probability functions into a single social probability function,
then using this social probability function to evaluate uncertain prospects. The ex
ante approach gives the separate subjective probability functions a direct evaluative
role, at least in a special case. Just to give one version, ex ante Pareto says: if for
each individual i, an uncertain prospect P is better for i than another uncertain
prospect P ′ relative to i’s own subjective probability function, then P is better than
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P ′. Both the ex post and ex ante approaches look appealing, but they are extremely
difficult to combine consistently. For example, given weak assumptions, there will
be prospects P and P ′ such that ex ante Pareto has the apparent pathology of
implying that P is better than P ′ despite the fact that P ′ is guaranteed to produce
a better outcome than P . But ex post approaches will adopt principles which from
the outset say that in such cases, P ′ is better than P .2
Now it is not my goal to try to answer any of the large questions raised in
this section. My claim is rather that they are questions with which ethicists must
engage, and that one’s answers to these questions may depend on one’s more gen-
eral ethical views. To illustrate, suppose one sees ethics as being primarily about
coordinating action to achieve good outcomes, and one is prepared to tolerate a
significant amount of indeterminacy in one’s normative theory. Then one may be
tempted to claim that the probabilities which are relevant to ethics are the ob-
jective probabilities alone. By contrast, suppose one instead sees ethics as being
about trying to achieve some sort of fair compromise between agents with diverse
beliefs and goals. Then it may seem tempting to allow in subjective probabilities
no matter how irrational, and to follow the ex ante approach. On this picture,
individual autonomy is central, and it may seem more important to respect the
notion of unanimity built into ex ante Pareto than to try to avoid the apparent
pathology which comes with it. There are, of course, many other options, but the
important point is that which probabilities are relevant to ethics, and how, is itself
a fundamental ethical question.
2. Outcomes
Some writers, however, think that probabilities are never relevant to what we
ought to do. A parallel view applies to the question of when one uncertain prospect
is better than another. Jackson [28] illustrates with the following. A doctor has
to choose between three treatments for a patient with a minor complaint. Drug
A would partially cure the complaint. One of drugs B and C would completely
cure the patient while the other would kill him, but the doctor cannot tell which is
which.
The obvious view, as Jackson notes, is that the doctor ought to give the patient
drug A. This verdict would be delivered by any broadly decision-theoretic account.
Along similar lines, the prospect associated with giving the patient drug A is better
than the prospects associated with drugs B and C. Call any view which assesses
actions and prospects involving uncertainty along broadly decision-theoretic lines
probability-based.
But there is a different view: if drug B would cure the patient, the doctor ought
to give the patient drug B; similarly for drug C. Likewise, if drug B would cure,
the prospect associated with giving drug B is better than the other prospects. Call
such views, positions which assess actions and prospects in terms of what their
consequences would be, outcome-based.
As the drug example shows, an objection to outcome-based views is that they
make the truth about what we ought to do too epistemically inaccessible, or provide
poor guides to action. But there are at least two interesting arguments for outcome-
based views.
2The large literature on this topic is rather technical, but Broome [4, ch. 7] provides a good
introduction and philosophical discussion. Mongin [49] contains a very general set of results.
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First, transposing an argument due to Thomson [77] to the present example,
suppose the pharmacist walks in and knowing full-well that drug B would cure the
patient, says to the doctor: “You ought to use drug B”. The pharmacist seems
right. But doesn’t that imply an outcome-based view?
In response, consider the case where the pharmacist says: “Drug B would cure.
So you ought to use drug B”. By the time the pharmacist has finished the first
sentence, the doctor has new evidence, and should upgrade her probabilities accord-
ingly. There is then no clash between a probability-based view and the truth of the
pharmacist’s second sentence. Likewise, I think that in the actual case something
like “Drug B would cure” is implied when the pharmacist just says: “You ought
to use drug B”. What is implied by the pharmacist’s normative assertion impacts
upon the probabilities the doctor should have, making the literal construal of the
normative assertion true (McCarthy [40]).
Second, advocates of probability-based views have to say which probability func-
tions are relevant to what we ought to do. But there are many candidates, e.g. the
probabilities of this agent or that agent, at this time or that time. Jackson con-
cludes that we have to recognize the existence of “an annoying profusion ... of a
whole range of oughts” (Jackson [28, p. 471]).
But this seems dissatisfying. When we ask ourselves or others what we ought
to do, we don’t want to learn that some oughts recommend this while others rec-
ommend that. We want to know what we ought to do full-stop. But if there is
only one ought, we need to privilege one probability function. The function of an
omniscient agent may seem to be the only distinguished choice, so we end up with
an outcome-based view.
In response, just because it is not obvious which probability function is privileged,
it does not follow that no function (or reasonably narrow class of functions) is
privileged. In the previous section we saw that if we adopt a probability-based
view, a variety of fairly fundamental ethical factors and disputes bears upon the
question of which probabilities are relevant to ethics. The complexity of this topic
explains why it is not obvious which probability function is privileged, but the fact
that the problem is complex hardly entails that some outcome-based view wins
by default. Outcome-based views have to be assessed in terms of various ethical
desiderata just as much as probability-based views do, and they do quite badly
in terms of desiderata such as the idea that an ethical theory should be suitably
action-guiding.
It is also worth noting that outcome-based views may result in large-scale in-
determinacy. The drug example stipulated that various counterfactuals relating
actions to outcomes are true. But an increasingly popular view claims that most
counterfactuals are false (see e.g. Ha´jek [18]). In particular, it will often be the case
that for some potential action A there is no outcome O such that the counterfactual:
‘If A were performed, O would result’, is true. On this view about counterfactuals,
the facts which outcome-based views have to call on are much sparser than might
have appeared, with the result that there is a lot more evaluative and normative in-
determinacy on outcome-based views than we might have hoped. This may further
undercut the appeal of outcome-based views.
In what follows, I will assume that some probability-based view is correct. But it
is a major question which conception of probability is relevant to ethics, so ethicists
need to be involved with questions about probability early on. In light of the
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difficulties of aggregating probability functions alluded to in the previous section,
ethicists also need to be prepared for the possibility that the eventual input into
ethics is going to be messier than a single probability function which satisfies the
usual axioms.
3. Terminology
However, to simplify I henceforth assume that probabilities are supplied and
satisfy the usual axioms. To reflect this I will often speak of risk rather than
probability or uncertainty. A lottery over a nonempty set of world-histories (past,
present and future) assigns positive probabilities to finitely many of the histories
with the probabilities all summing to one (these are sometimes known as lotteries
with finite support). I will often write lotteries in the form [p1, h1; . . . ; pm, hm]
where the hj ’s are the histories which could result from the lottery and the pj ’s
their probabilities.
The betterness relation holds between two lotteries just in case the first is at least
as good as the second. An individual i’s individual betterness relation holds between
two lotteries L1 and L2 just in case: i exists in every history which could result from
the lotteries, and L1 is at least as good for i as L2. By identifying histories with
lotteries in which the history gets probability one, and restricting the betterness
and individual betterness relations to such lotteries, we obtain relations between
histories. I will refer to these relations as risk-free versions of the originals. For
example, the risk-free betterness relation holds between two histories just in case
the first is at least as good as the second.
There are many views about when one history is better for someone than another,
or in a more suggestive phrase, about what makes someone’s life go best (Parfit [56],
Appendix I). The three main views are that having a good life is a matter of:
(i) having good quality experiences; (ii) satisfying one’s preferences or desires; or
(iii) attaining what are said to be objective goods, such as deep knowledge or
close personal relationships. However, some philosophers think that when doing
ethics, we should not be in the business of making fine-grained comparisons between
different people’s lives, but should only make interpersonal comparisons in terms
of such things as the resources, freedoms, or opportunities people enjoy; see e.g.
Rawls [62] and Sen [72]. Which of these views is correct will not matter in what
follows, but it will be important that the discussion can accommodate any of them.
We will be talking a lot about the betterness relation. Not everyone thinks that
this is a useful way of looking at ethics (see e.g. Foot [14], Thomson [78]). But in
response, talking about betterness can be seen as a harmless organizing tool (see e.g.
Broome [4]), and is popular enough for us to be able to cover many major positions.
For example, consequentialism (on a probability-based interpretation) is the view
that lotteries can be ranked in terms of betterness, and that betterness somehow
determines normativity.3 For example, act consequentialism says that we always
ought to bring about the best available lottery, whereas rule consequentialism says
that we always ought to act according to the rule such that, if everyone acted in
accord with it (or on a different version, accepted it), the best available lottery
3As far as I can see, there is no universally accepted account of consequentialism, so I am only
trying to convey the rough idea rather than provide a precise definition. In addition, the way
moral philosophers use the term ‘consequentialism’ should not be confused with an important
decision-theoretic idea which also goes by the name of ‘consequentialism’; see e.g. Hammond [20].
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would be realized. Contractualism tends to be framed not in terms of betterness,
but in terms of an ideal social contract. However, when it comes to the assessment
of different social contracts, contractualists are concerned with competing sets of
principles or rules (see e.g. Scanlon [66]), so at the concrete level of normative
theorizing, it is often hard to tell the difference between contractualism and rule
consequentialism. Finally, deontology is often characterized as the position that
some acts are wrong even when they would have the best available consequences,
such as killing one innocent person to prevent five innocent people from being killed.
4. Expected utility theory
This chapter expresses the view that whatever one ultimately makes of expected
utility theory and decision theory, looking at basic evaluative and normative ques-
tions through the frameworks they provide is extremely useful. This section there-
fore provides a quick rehearsal, first of the terminology of expected utility theory,
and then of its most basic result. It takes X to be some fixed nonempty set. In
applications, X will usually be a set of histories, or more colloquially, outcomes.
A preorder on X is a binary relation R on X which is reflexive (∀x ∈ X, xRx)
and transitive (∀x,y,z ∈ X, xRy & yRz =⇒ xRz). It is complete if for all
x, y ∈ X, either xRy or yRx. It is incomplete just in case it is not complete. An
ordering of X is just a complete preorder of X. If L and M are lotteries over X,
then for all α ∈ (0, 1), αL + (1 − α)M is the so-called compound lottery in which
each member x of X has probability αp+ (1−α)q where p is x’s probability under
L and q is its probability under M . Suppose that % is an ordering on X. Then a
real-valued function f is said to represent the ordering just in case: for every x and
y in X, x % y if and only if f(x) ≥ f(y).
Suppose that % is a binary relation on lotteries over X. Here are the three
expected utility axioms.
Ordering % is a complete preorder on X.
Strong Independence For all lotteries L, M and N , and α ∈ (0, 1): L % M if
and only if αL+ (1− α)N % αM + (1− α)N .
The rough idea of Strong Independence is that the “addition” of the same lottery
N to either side of L % M should make no difference: the added N ’s will cancel
out. Strong Independence is sometimes explained by imagining that the compound
lotteries will be realized by first tossing a biased coin, where heads has a probability
of α and tails a probability of 1 − α, then running whichever lottery results. For
example, suppose you strictly prefer L to M , and you now have to decide between
αL+ (1−α)N and αM + (1−α)N . If the coin lands on tails, you will face N in ei-
ther case, so in that scenario there is nothing to choose between the two compound
lotteries. But if the coin lands on heads, you will face L or M , and will therefore
prefer to have chosen αL+ (1−α)N to αM + (1−α)N . Since heads has a positive
probability, you should therefore strictly prefer αL+ (1− α)N to αM + (1− α)N
prior to the coin being tossed. Or at least that is one of the typical ways of mo-
tivating Strong Independence. The example has focused on preference relations,
but it can clearly be applied directly and without any discussion of rationality to
a variety of evaluative comparatives, such as betterness and individual betterness
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Continuity For all lotteries L, M and M such that L  M  N ,4 there exist α,
β ∈ (0, 1) such that M  αL+ (1− α)N and βL+ (1− β)N M .
To illustrate, suppose you strictly prefer $1000 to $100, and strictly prefer $100
to $10. Then if your preferences are continuous, there will be some lottery which
almost guarantees you $1000 with a tiny chance of $10 (one in a billion, say) which
you will strictly prefer to getting $100 for certain. And you will strictly prefer $100
for certain to some lottery which almost guarantees you $10 with a tiny chance of
$1000. As the example is meant to suggest, many people think that Continuity is
a plausible requirement on various evaluative comparatives.
A binary relation % on lotteries over X satisfies the expected utility axioms just
in case it satisfies Ordering, Strong Independence, and Continuity. Here is the most
basic result of expected utility theory, due to von Neumann and Morgenstern [80],
but anticipated in a deeper way by Ramsey [60].
Theorem 1. (von Neumann and Morgenstern) Let X be a nonempty set, and %
be a binary relation on lotteries on X which satisfies the expected utility axioms.
Then there exists a real-valued function u on X such that
(i) For all lotteries L1 = [p1, x1; . . . ; pm, xm] and L2 = [q1, y1; . . . ; qn, yn],
L1 % L2 ⇐⇒ p1u(x1) + · · ·+ pmu(xm) ≥ q1u(y1) + · · ·+ qnu(yn)
(ii) Any function v satisfies (i) when substituted for u if and only if there exist
real numbers a > 0 and b such that v = au+ b.
Roughly speaking, (i) says that there is a function u (often referred to as a ‘vNM
utility function’) such that L1 % L2 if and only if the expected value of u associated
with L1 is at least as great as the expected value of u associated with L1. The
expected value of u associated with a lottery is obtained by applying u to each
of the lottery’s possible outcomes, weighting the result by the probability of those
outcomes, then adding all those numbers up. In such circumstances, I will say
that the ordering % is represented by the expected value of u. (ii) says that the
function u is unique up to choice of zero and unit, or in fancier terminology, unique
up to positive affine transformation. For an analogy, Farenheight and Centigrade
measure temperature in essentially the same way, except that they use different
zeros and units. Overall, the main message is that if an ordering of lotteries satisfies
the expected utility axioms, it can be represented by the expected value of some
function which is more or less unique.
The literature on expected utility theory is vast. It has been applied to all sorts
of topics, and has received a great deal of defense, criticism, and mathematical
elaboration.5 Beyond a few remarks, this chapter will assume some sort of familiar-
ity with the defense, but will rehearse many of the criticisms, particularly as they
apply to ethics. We now need to ask: When is one lottery better than another?
Which lotteries ought we to bring about? We begin with the first question.
4L M is defined as L %M and not M % L. L ∼M is defined as L %M and M % L.
5At varying levels of philosophical and mathematical ambition, personal favourites include
Fishburn [12], Resnik [63], Kreps [35], Broome [4], Hammond [20], Ok [54] and Gilboa [16]. In
this volume, see Buchak [6].
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5. Expected goodness
Some philosophers imply that that if we know when one history is better than
another, the question of when one lottery is better than another is straightforward.
For example, Parfit [56, p. 25] and Scheﬄer [68, p.1, note 2] start their discussions
of consequentialism only by assuming
(1) The risk-free betterness relation is an ordering
To cover risky cases, they think that we only need to appeal to expected utility
theory. In particular, they think we just need to add
(2) One lottery is at least as good as another if and only if its expected goodness
is at least as great
In other words, the betterness relation is represented by the expected value of
goodness. Parfit and Scheﬄer are not claiming that it is obvious when one history
is better than another. Rather, they are claiming that once we have an ordering of
histories in terms of betterness, (2) then tells us how to order lotteries in terms of
betterness.
Now Parfit and Scheﬄer are quite brief about this and their real concerns lie
elsewhere. But this sort of claim is commonly made, and it is important to realise
that it contains a serious mistake. The basic difficulty is that (2) presupposes the
existence of goodness measures, measures of how good histories are, and various
problems arise depending on where we think these measures are coming from.
First, provided certain technical conditions are met, (1) guarantees that the
risk-free betterness relation can be represented by some function.6 To deal with
the possibility that there may be more than one such function, we might treat the
set of all goodness measures as the set of all of the functions which represent the
risk-free betterness relation. It would then be natural to interpret (2) as saying:
L1 % L2 if and only if the expected goodness of L1 is at least as great as the
expected goodness of L2 according to every goodness measure. Unfortunately,
however, this approach leads to massive indeterminacy. An example will illustrate.
Suppose there are exactly three histories x, y and z, ordered x  y  z by the
risk-free betterness relation. Let L be the lottery [ 12 , x;
1
2z] and let us consider how
it compares with y. Consider the two functions u and v defined by u(x) = v(x) = 1,
u(y) = 0.9, v(y) = 0.1, and u(z) = v(z) = 0. Both of these functions represent
the risk-free betterness relation, and therefore count as goodness measures on the
current proposal. But according to u, the expected goodness of L is less than that
of y, and according to v, the expected goodness of L is greater than that of y. The
current proposal therefore leaves L and y unranked, and it only takes a bit more
work to show that this will be true of almost every pair of lotteries. So interpreting
(2) along these lines does almost nothing to cover risky cases.
Second, to get around this problem we might hope to narrow down all of the
functions which represent the risk-free betterness relation to (essentially) a single
6The result goes back to Cantor; for details, see any reasonably advanced book on utility
theory, such as Kreps [35] or Ok [54].
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function to be used as a goodness measure.7 This line of thought is tacitly quite
common, and what tends to happen is that one of the functions which represents
the risk-free betterness relation seems quite simple or natural, and it is taken to
be the goodness measure.8 An old idea will illustrate. According to this idea,
each ‘just noticeable difference’ between outcomes is given the same magnitude of
goodness, so that the difference in goodness between the best outcome and the
second best outcome is equal to the difference in goodness between the second best
outcome and the third best outcome, and so on.9 In the toy example of the previous
paragraph, this would be done by a function w where w(x) = 1, w(y) = 0.5, and
w(z) = 0. Using (2) would then provide a ranking of all lotteries in terms of
betterness. For example, L and y would turn out to be equally good. However,
this proposal is ethically entirely arbitrary, and it is easy to invent circumstances in
which the method delivers implausible conclusions. To illustrate, let us apply the
same idea to individual betterness relations. Consider a wine connoisseur who is
able to discriminate among a vast number of wines, and let us take her ordering of
wines as given. Let a+ be outcome in which she gets the best possible wine, a the
next wine down, r some rough house wine, and r+ the next one up. The current
method would regard the two lotteries [ 12 , a
+; 12 , r] and [
1
2 , a;
1
2 , r
+] as equally good.
But our connoisseur might regard experiencing the best possible wine as worth
risking a lot for, and improving a rough house wine as hardly worth anything,
leading her to conclude that the first lottery is better. But the current method
woodenly regards the two lotteries as equally good.
Third, one might approach the problem from a different direction. Suppose we
start with a claim which is presupposed by (2), namely
Social EUT The betterness relation satisfies the expected utility axioms
Now by the vNM theorem, Social EUT implies
(3) For some real-valued function on histories f , the betterness relation is repre-
sented by the expected value of f
We might then define f as a goodness measure (along with its positive affine
transformations). It follows that (2) now gives us the right results: one lottery
is better than another just in case its expected goodness is greater. Unfortu-
nately, however, just as the first method yielded almost complete indeterminacy,
this method is almost completely uninformative. In almost all cases, it provides
us with no concrete method of ranking lotteries. For example, in the toy example
used to show why the first method leads to indeterminacy, it is consistent with the
present method that L is better than y, that L and y are equally good, and that L
is worse than y.
7More precisely, to a set of functions which are all related by positive affine transformation.
The vNM theorem tells us that these will all be equivalent when it comes to ordering lotteries in
terms of expected goodness.
8For example, McCarthy [42] argues that this approach is common in accounts of the priority
view and leads to unsatisfactory definitions of it.
9The basic idea goes back to Edgeworth [10]. For criticism and defense see e.g. Vickrey [79]
and Ng [53] respectively.
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We have now looked at three ways of trying to fill in the story gestured towards
by Parfit, Scheﬄer and many others, the story which thinks that once we are given
the risk-free betterness relation, we only need to appeal to expected utility theory
to cover risky cases. Each attempt to say where goodness measures are coming from
leads to a problem. The first leads to indeterminacy, the second to arbitrariness,
and the third to uninformativeness. Now expected utility theory does indeed turn
out to be a powerful tool for thinking about evaluative questions about risk, and
even questions which do not seem to be about risk. But the story has to be more
sophisticated than anything we have so far seen.
6. Veils of ignorance
To simplify, I will from now on assume that in evaluating lotteries, we are only
concerned with the ethics of distribution, and in addition, not concerned with
rights or responsibilities. In particular, I will assume: if h1 and h2 contain the
same population and for each member i, h1 is exactly as good for i as h2, then h1
and h2 are equally good.
The best known strategy for augmenting an appeal to expected utility theory
is to use a so-called veil of ignorance, made famous but used in different ways by
Harsanyi [21] and Rawls [61].
Assume a fixed population 1, . . . , n. Harsanyi’s presentation of his argument tac-
itly identifies individual betterness relations with individual preference relations.
But there are objections to that identification, and following Broome [4] we can
avoid them by restating Harsanyi’s argument in terms of individual betterness rela-
tions. This enables us to leave it open whether the content of individual betterness
relations has to do with preference satisfaction, the quality of experience, achieve-
ments, or some other account. Harsanyi’s argument then begins with
Individual EUT Individual betterness relations satisfy the expected utility ax-
ioms.
Assume also that interpersonal comparisons are unproblematic in that
Interpersonal Completeness For all individuals i and j and histories h1 and h2,
either h1 is at least as good for i as h2 is for j, or vice versa.
Together Individual EUT and Interpersonal Completeness imply that there are
real-valued functions u1, . . . , un on histories such that (i) for each individual i, i’s
individual betterness relation is represented by the expected value of ui, and (ii)
for all individuals i and j, h1 is at least as good for i as h2 is for j if and only
if ui(h1) ≥ uj(h2). From now on, u1, . . . , un will always be such functions, but
their existence presupposes Individual EUT and Interpersonal Completeness. I will
sometimes call them utility functions.
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Harsanyi [21] took ethics to be impartial.10 But how should this be modeled,
or made more concrete? This is where Harsanyi appeals to a veil of ignorance.
Choosing under the equiprobability assumption is understood as choosing between
two social situations on the assumption that one is equally likely to turn out to
be each member of the population. Then Harsanyi took the idea that ethics is
impartial to be well-modeled by
Veil of Harsanyi One lottery is at least as good as another if and only if it would
be weakly preferred by every self-interested and rational person choosing under the
equiprobability assumption
I will skip the formal details, but from Individual EUT, Interpersonal Complete-
ness and Veil of Harsanyi, Harsanyi gave a simple argument for
Sum The betterness relation is represented by the expected value of the function
u1 + · · ·+ un
Rawls [61] agrees with Harsanyi that ethics is impartial, and that a veil of igno-
rance is a good way of modelling impartiality. To focus on their treatment of veils,
we will ignore other differences, such as the different way in which they understand
interpersonal comparisons. With those aside, Rawls can be taken as agreeing with
Individual EUT and Interpersonal Completeness. But his interpretation of the veil
differs. Choosing under the uncertainty assumption is understood as choosing be-
tween two social situations on the assumption that one will turn out to be one of
the members of the population, but with complete uncertainty about who that will
be. Then Rawls took the idea that ethics is impartial to be well-modeled by
Veil of Rawls One history is at least as good as another if and only if it would be
weakly preferred by every self-interested and rational persons choosing under the
uncertainty assumption
Rawls then argued that Individual EUT, Interpersonal Completeness and Veil
of Rawls would result in
Maximin One history is better than another if and only if the former is better for
the worst off
Many commentators have thought Rawls should instead have concluded with
Leximin One history is better than another if and only if it is better for the worst
off, or equally good for the worst off and better for the second worst off, and so on
10Some of the arguments which follow make slightly stronger assumptions about interpersonal
comparisons than I have made explicit. The point of these is to make various impartiality assump-
tions have an effect, and also to guarantee that the functions u1, . . . , un are essentially unique, in
that if some other set of functions v1, . . . , vn plays their role, there are real numbers a > 0 and b
such that for all i, vi = aui + b. But I will suppress this slightly technical issue. For full details,
see e.g. Broome [5, p. 96].
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These arguments raise three basic questions. (i) What does rational choice under
the uncertainty assumption really require? (ii) Given that one is going to model
impartiality via some sort of veil of ignorance, is the uncertainty assumption a better
way of doing it than the equiprobability assumption? (iii) Is modeling impartiality
via a veil of ignorance a good idea anyway?
Briefly, (i) seems to be unclear. For example, suppose the Ramsey-Savage story
is right about rational choice under conditions of uncertainty. For the agent behind
the veil to lack implicit subjective probabilities of any degree of determinateness
– and thus to model complete uncertainty – that story implies that her prefer-
ences are incomplete. At best, maximin (or leximin) would then seem to be but
one rationally permissible choice among many, whereas Rawls needs it to be ratio-
nally required (see Angner [2] for further discussion). For (ii), the equiprobability
assumption seems at first glance a reasonable attempt at giving impartiality a
concrete and reasonably clear interpretation. Moreover, given the difficulties in
understanding what rationality in conditions of complete uncertainty requires, it
is hard to see what motivates shifting to the uncertainty assumption, aside from a
question-begging attempt to avoid Sum. I will return to some of these issues, but
the most fundamental question is (iii), and a later result of Harsanyi’s seems to
show that the use of veils of ignorance was never a good idea in the first place.
7. Harsanyi’s theorem
To present Harsanyi’s result we need to state two more premises. We continue
to assume a fixed population. The first premise expresses a kind of impartiality.
Impartiality For all histories h1 and h2, if there is some permutation pi of the
population such that for each individual i, h1 is exactly as good for i as h2 is for
pi(i), then h1 and h2 are equally good
The second premise is a so-called Pareto assumption.
Pareto (i) If two lotteries are equally good for each member of the population,
they are equally good. (ii) If one lottery is at least as good for every member of
the population and better for some members, then it is better.
This is Harsanyi’s theorem. For an accessible proof, see e.g. Resnik [63].
Theorem 2. (Harsanyi) Assume a constant population. Then Individual EUT, In-
terpersonal Completeness, Social EUT, Impartiality and Pareto jointly imply Sum.
To recap what Sum says, the conclusion of the theorem says that one lottery is
better than another just in case it has a greater sum of individual expected utilities.
This implies that one history is better than another just in case it has a greater
sum of individual utilities. However, in its classical form, utilitarianism is usually
defined as the claim that one history is better than another just in case it has
a greater sum of individual goodness. This raises the disputed question of what
Sum has to do with utilitarianism, and thus whether Harsanyi’s premises imply
utilitarianism. Roughly speaking, Harsanyi’s premises imply the classical version
of utilitarianism just in case individual utilities are measures of individual goodness.
Simplifying somewhat, Sen [71] and Weymark [82] denied that the two should be
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identified, whereas along with e.g. Harsanyi [24], Broome [4] and Hammond [19],
I believe that they should be identified. I will say more about this in section 14,
but the most important claim is that it does not really matter who is right. The
conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem appears to tell us exactly what the content of the
betterness relation is, and what name we should give to that conclusion is of much
less importance.
In my view, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of Harsanyi’s result. I will
assume enough familiarity with expected utility theory, references to which were
provided earlier, to see the prima facie case for Individual EUT and Social EUT. The
rough idea is that the prima facie case for rational preference relations satisfying
the expected utility axioms can be modified to apply directly to evaluative relations
like individual betterness relations and the betterness relation. The prima facie case
for the other premises is fairly natural as well. The best way to explore this further
will be to look at criticisms of the premises. We will do that shortly, but first I
want to consider how Harsanyi’s theorem improves on what we have seen so far.
The popular appeal to expected utility theory sketched in section 5 suffered from
telling us little of any use about the betterness relation. But if we take individual
betterness relations as given, and accept the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem, the
theorem shows that the content of the betterness relation is completely determined.
Consider now veil of ignorance arguments. Both Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s accept
Individual EUT and Interpersonal Completeness. That leaves Harsanyi’s veil ar-
gument with Veil of Harsanyi and Rawls’s with Veil of Rawls, while Harsanyi’s
theorem is left with Social EUT, Impartiality and Pareto.
Harsanyi’s veil argument works by assuming that the person behind veil is ra-
tional, and therefore has preferences which satisfy the expected utility axioms.
Given that, Veil of Harsanyi yields Social EUT, and also, obviously, Impartiality
and Pareto. So Harsanyi’s veil argument enjoys no advantage over his theorem,
and the theorem simply bypasses worries about veil arguments expressed by e.g.
Scanlon [66].
The comparison with Rawls is less clear. When discussing the veil, Rawls usually
only considers the problem of ranking different histories. But someone behind the
veil could also try to rank different lotteries (thus facing two forms of ignorance:
uncertainty behind the veil, and risk beyond the veil). So we can ask what she
thinks about Social EUT, Impartiality and Pareto. It would be surprising if the
uncertainty assumption led her to reject any of these claims, and thence Sum. But
since Rawls is so plainly opposed to Sum, I think this suggests that aspects of his
informal reasoning have not been fully captured in what seems to be his formal
model. Sections 11 and 12 will discuss two major Rawlsian worries about some of
Harsanyi’s premises. But to foreshadow, these worries can be expressed directly as
criticisms of the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem, and appealing to the veil does not
seem to add anything.
Finally, we will see in section 9 that there is at least one major view about
the ethics of distribution which is impartial but is immediately ruled out by the
adoption of a veil of ignorance, whether Harsanyi’s or Rawls’s. So much the worse
for the veil as a model of impartiality. Thus in my view, the veil just turns out
to be an unhelpful distraction, and the proper focus of attention for the ethics of
distribution should be Harsanyi’s theorem.
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8. Variable populations
Before looking at various worries about and alternatives to the premises of
Harsanyi’s theorem, it is worth mentioning a way in which it can be extended.
Problems where the population can vary are difficult. But we do not need to add
much to the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem to make progress.
The following says that only the kinds of lives people are living matters, not the
identities of those people.
Anonymity For all histories h1 and h2 containing finite populations of the same
size, if there is a mapping ρ from the population of h1 onto the population of h2
such that for every member i of the population of h1, h1 is exactly as good for i as
h2 is for ρ(i), then h1 and h2 are equally good
This premise makes the nonidentity problem discussed by Parfit [56] rather triv-
ial: if no one else will be affected, and a woman has to choose between having one
of two different children, Anonymity plus Pareto implies that it would be better if
she had the child whose life would be better.
Let U be the function defined on histories such that for all history h with pop-
ulation 1, . . . , n,
U(h) := u1(h) + u2(h) + · · ·+ un(h)
Then the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem, but with Impartiality replaced by the
stronger Anonymity, jointly imply
Same Number Claim Assume that all histories contain populations of the same
size. Then the risk-free betterness relation is represented by U
Turning to comparisons between populations of different sizes, I will outline an
approach due to Broome [5], and also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [3]. I lack
the space to discuss the details, but the crucial step is to argue for the
Neutral existence claim There exists a life l such that in every situation, pro-
vided no one already existing is affected, (i) it is better to create an extra life
which is better than l; (ii) it is worse to create an extra life which is worse than
l; (iii) it is a matter of indifference to create an extra life which is exactly as good as l
Call such a life a neutral existence. Given a parameter v, let V be the function
defined on histories such that for each history h with population 1, . . . , n
V (h) := (u1(h)− v) + (u2(h)− v) + · · ·+ (un(h)− v)
Some simple algebra shows that the same number and neutral existence claims
together imply the
Variable number claim Assume that all histories contain finite populations.
Then the risk-free betterness relation is represented by V , where v is the utility
level of a neutral existence
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The value of v makes no difference to same number problems. For when com-
paring two histories containing the same sized population using V , the subtracted
v’s cancel out. In variable number problems, the presence of v in the definition of
V means that ignoring effects on other people’s lives, someone’s existence makes a
positive contribution towards goodness if and only if her life is better than a neutral
existence.
Nothing so far said tells us what the value of v is, however. Setting it will
involve further ethical issues, and is difficult to do in a way which respects common
intuitions (Broome [5]). For example, setting it low leads to the conclusion that a
large number of people (e.g. a billion) all with extremely good lives is worse than
an extremely large number (e.g. a billion billion) all with lives which may seem
hardly worth living. Parfit [56] evidently did not think much of this idea when he
famously called it ‘the repugnant conclusion.’ On the other hand, setting the value
of v high makes it bad to create someone who would have an intuitively good life,
and that may seem implausible too.
When we ethicists first start to think seriously about probability, it may seem
like a bane for us, vastly expanding the complexity of questions we have to address.
But it may now look like a blessing. The problem of aggregating individual well-
being to form an overall judgment about when one history is better than another
seems difficult. Yet without appearing to make any assumptions about aggrega-
tion, and instead by largely appealing to expected utility theory, which is all about
probability, Harsanyi’s theorem seems to provide a solution. Section 15 will look
more closely at the question of whether the theorem really does solve the ‘problem
of aggregation.’ But we first examine criticisms of and alternatives to Harsanyi’s
premises which are also about probability.
9. Equality and fairness
The additive form of the conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem will make some suspect
that its premises conflict with the idea that in the distribution of goods, equality
and fairness matter. But where, if anywhere, is the tension? Assume a population of
two people, A and B, and consider the following lotteries, which combine examples
due to Diamond [8] and Myerson [50].
LE heads tails
A 1 0
B 1 0
LF heads tails
A 1 0
B 0 1
LU heads tails
A 1 1
B 0 0
Anyone who thinks that equality is valuable should think that LE is better than
LF . For while LE and LF are equally good for each person, LE has in its favour that
it guarantees equality of outcome while LF guarantees inequality (Myerson [50]).
But Pareto implies that LE and LF are equally good, so it is inconsistent with the
idea that equality is valuable.
Anyone who thinks that fairness is valuable should think that LF is better than
LU . For while Impartiality implies that the outcomes under LF and LU are equally
good, LF has in its favour that it distributes the chances fairly (Diamond [8]).
Diamond’s example leads to the first of a series of challenges to the assumptions
about expected utility in Harsanyi’s premises. By Impartiality, all of the outcomes
under LF and LU are equally good. Strong Independence of the betterness relation
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then implies that LF and LU are equally good.
11 Hence the assumption that
the betterness relation satisfies the expected utility axioms, in particular Strong
Independence, clashes with the idea that fairness is valuable.
I think that Myerson’s and Diamond’s examples lie at the heart of concerns with
equality and fairness.12 It is difficult to argue for this in a short space, though
section 16 will say more. But suppose it is correct. How could the examples be
generalized into full-blown theories about what it is for equality or fairness to be
valuable?
I will just illustrate an approach for the case of equality. Suppose we are given
a preorder %e on histories such that h1 %e h2 if and only if h1 is uncontroversially
(among egalitarians) at least as good in terms of equality as h2. My own account of
the extension of %e is in McCarthy [44]. But to give two simple cases, every equal
distribution is going to be uncontroversially better in terms of equality than every
unequal distribution, and all equal distributions are going to be uncontroversially
equally good in terms of equality. Consider
Equality-neutral Pareto Assume a fixed population. For all lotteries L1 =
[p1, h1; . . . pm, hm] and L2 = [p1, k1; . . . ; pm, km]: (i) if L1 is exactly as good as
L2 for all individuals, and hj ∼e kj for all j, then L1 and L2 are equally good; and
(ii) if L1 is at least as good as L2 for all individuals and better for some individual,
and hj %e kj for all j, then L1 is better than L2
Equality principle Assume a fixed population. For all lotteries L1 = [p1, h1; . . . ;
pm, hm] and L2 = [p1, k1; . . . ; pm, km]: if L1 is at least as good as L2 for all indi-
viduals, hj %e kj for all j and hj e kj for some j, then L1 is better than L2
McCarthy [44] argues that together, these principles are the core of egalitarian-
ism. Equality-neutral Pareto is a weakening of Pareto, designed to avoid clashes
with examples like Myerson’s. The equality principle is designed to generalize the
idea that equality is valuable, as illustrated by Myerson’s example. Thus we obtain
a very general egalitarian theory by starting with Harsanyi’s premises, weakening
Pareto to its equality-neutral cousin, then adding the equality principle.
Notice that the equality principle is inconsistent with the adoption of either
Harsanyi’s or Rawls’s veil of ignorance. But it can easily be shown to be consistent
with the notion of impartiality captured by Impartiality. So if it was meant only
to model impartiality, the adoption of a veil of ignorance is too strong.
The characterization of the idea that equality is valuable via the equality princi-
ple exploits natural dominance ideas. Roughly speaking, suppose that each part of
some object x is at least as good with respect to some value V as the corresponding
part of object y. Then x is said to weakly dominate y in terms of the value V . If x
weakly dominates y, but y does not weakly dominate x, then x strictly dominates
y. Thus the equality principle says that if L1 weakly dominates L2 in terms of well-
being, and strictly dominates L2 in terms of equality, then L1 is better than L2. I
11Proof: for all lotteries L and M , write L %M for ‘L is at least as good as M ’. By Impartiality,
[1, 0] ∼ [0, 1]. Strong Independence for % then implies LU = 12 [1, 0]+ 12 [1, 0] ∼ 12 [0, 1]+ 12 [1, 0] = LF
as required.
12This is not quite right. In my view it is better to say that Myerson’s example is about
equality of outcome, and Diamond’s is about equality of prospects, not fairness. But here I stick
with the more usual terminology. For reasons for not talking about fairness, see McCarthy [44].
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lack the space to discuss the details, but I believe that the way to characterize the
idea that fairness is valuable is to develop dominance ideas in a way suggested by
Diamond’s example. However, while the apparent similarities between Diamond’s
and Myerson’s examples suggest parallels, it appears that there are subtle asym-
metries between concerns with equality and concerns with fairness (McCarthy and
Thomas [47]).
10. Priority
Parfit [57] suggested that what he called the priority view is an important alter-
native to egalitarianism, sharing many of its apparent virtues but avoiding what he
called the leveling-down objection. He summarized it via the slogan that “benefit-
ing the worse off matters more”, but commentators have been divided over whether
he managed to articulate a genuine alternative to egalitarianism.
A puzzle about making sense of the priority view is that its distinctive feature is
advertized as an intrapersonal phenomenon: what is bad about people being worse
off is that they are worse off than they might have been Parfit [56, p. 369]. This
has suggested to commentators that according to the priority view, it matters more
to more to benefit someone the worse off she is even when no others are around at
all (Rabinowicz [59]). But in cases where only one person is around and risk is not
involved, the priority view, like any other sane view, will accept that one history is
better than another if and only if it is better for the sole person.
Matters are different, however, when risk is involved. Several commentators
have thought that the priority view should be formulated in a way which makes it
have distinctive consequences in one-person cases involving risk (Rabinowicz [59],
McCarthy [41], and Otsuka and Voorhoeve [55]). I am inclined to go further and say
that the key idea behind the priority view receives its clearest and most fundamental
expression in such cases.
To illustrate, suppose A is the only person around, and compare the history
h = [1] with the lottery L = [ 12 , 2;
1
2 , 0], with the numbers supplied by uA. Because
L and h are equally good for A, Pareto implies that they are equally good. But I
believe that the priority view should be understood as saying that h is better than
L.
More generally, I believe that the key idea of the priority view is what I call the
Priority principle Assume a fixed population. For all lotteries L1 = [
1
2 , h1,
1
2 , h2]
and L2 = [
1
2 , h3,
1
2 , h4] and each member k of the population: if (i) for each member
i of the population apart from k, h1 is exactly as good for i as h3 and h2 is exactly
as good for i as h4, and (ii) h3, h4 and L1 are equally good for k while h1 is better
for k than h2, then L2 is better than L1
Notice that this is inconsistent with the equality principle. Some writers find
it absurd that in one-person worlds, the betterness relation and the sole person’s
individual betterness relation could diverge (e.g. Otsuka and Voorhoeve [55]), as
the priority principle implies. Rabinowicz [59] regards this claim as acceptable,
while e.g. Parfit [58] offers a defense.
But rather than discuss possible defences of the priority principle, I will note a
less discussed objection to the priority view. The priority view can be formulated by
starting with Harsanyi’s premises, weakening Pareto far enough to accommodate
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the priority principle, then adding the priority principle (McCarthy [43]). But
when this is done, any account of the extension of the betterness relation which is
consistent with the Harsanyi premises turns out to be consistent with the priority
view premises, and vice versa. But the priority view has a more complicated way of
describing the betterness relation, because of the less simple relationship it posits
between betterness and individual betterness in one-person worlds. So the objection
is that the priority view fails to provide a reasonable alternative to the Harsanyi
premises, not because of any ethically absurd implications, but because of the
theoretical vice of needless complexity (cf Harsanyi [24], Broome [4], McCarthy [41,
43]).13
11. Continuity
Continuity is seldom discussed. When it is mentioned, it is often said just to
be a technical assumption. But when the claim is that the betterness relation or
individual betterness relations satisfy Continuity, this is a clear mistake.
To illustrate, let a be a very good life, a+ a slightly better life, and z an extremely
bad life, such as being in severe pain or enslaved for a long time. The claim that
individual betterness relations satisfy Continuity implies that there is a gamble
which would almost guarantee an individual a+ with a small chance of z which
is better for the individual than having a for certain. But regardless of what one
thinks about this case, it is not a technical assumption to claim that the risk is
worth it. It is a substantive evaluative judgment, and different views about it are
reasonable. For what it is worth, I believe that many of Rawls’s informal remarks
about his veil of ignorance would have been more naturally modeled by denying
that individual betterness relations satisfy Continuity because of this kind of case
than by his actual model.
It is clear that Continuity is something ethicists should pay attention to. The
good news is that the result of weakening the expected utility axioms by dropping
Continuity is formally well understood, thanks to results by Hausner [26] and others.
But there are several pieces of bad news. First, the general statement of Haus-
ner’s result is quite mathematically complex and not easy to speak about informally.
Second, it is time to stop speaking of the continuity axiom. There are several EUT-
style continuity axioms (see e.g. Hammond [20]), and it is far from clear what the
ethical grounds for adopting one but not another might be. Third, speaking loosely,
Continuity failures occur when one lottery in some sense has “infinitesimal” value
compared with another. But such cases pose a challenge to standard treatments
of probability as well, and this needs to be incorporated into the analysis.14 In
summary, perhaps in the end ethicists can safely ignore Continuity. But it would
be better to know that than to hope for it, and the work needed to arrive at such
a conclusion appears to be substantial.15
13As an analogy, consider again the best-system analysis of laws. Suppose someone offers some
account of the laws of the world which captures all relevant facts. But this account is more complex
than some other account which also captures all relevant facts. On the best-system analysis, the
more complex account is mistaken about what the laws are, despite getting the relevant facts
right. McCarthy [43] argues that the priority view is mistaken on similar grounds.
14 For an accessible account of how the challenge applies to Savage’s treatment of subjective
probability, and a sketch of mathematically sophisticated responses, see Gilboa [16] pp. 99–100.
15For recent work in this direction, see Jensen [30].
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12. Incommensurability
One of the major contributions of the contractualist literature has been to force
us to take seriously difficulties with evaluative comparisons of different kinds of
goods. But part of the assumption that the betterness relation and individual bet-
terness relations satisfy the expected utility axioms is that these relations are com-
plete. But from the perspective of difficulties with evaluative comparisons, these
completeness assumptions look far from obvious. They may seem particularly im-
plausible if we adopt the popular view that the basis for such things as interpersonal
comparisons should be as neutral as possible between competing substantive views
about what a good life is, as argued, for example, in Rawls [62].
One response would be to adopt something like resources, freedoms, or op-
portunities as the basis for interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons (see e.g.
Rawls [62], Sen [72]). However, the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem are silent on
the content of individual betterness relations, so there is no obvious reason why
the theorem cannot be run when their content is understood in terms of resources
and so on. Nevertheless, even resources have their own problems to do with com-
parability because of the different nature of different kinds of resources. So this
response is a diversion, and we should turn directly to Harsanyi’s premises to see
what can be done about difficulties with comparability.
The most immediately tempting response is simply to drop the completeness
assumptions. This means that the various evaluative relations featuring in the
theorem become preorders which are not assumed to be complete. A large advan-
tage of working with preorders is that mathematically speaking, they are relatively
tractable. For example, a corollary of Szpilrajn’s theorem is that a preorder is
identical to the intersection of all of the complete preorders which extend it. This
has the advantage that in thinking about preorders one can often work most of the
time with complete preorders anyway.
This corollary is strikingly parallel to the superevaluationist treatment of vague
predicates: a sentence involving a vague predicate is true if it is true on all admis-
sible sharpenings of the predicate, false if it is false on all admissible sharpenings,
and neither true nor false otherwise.
But this should suggest caution: if a natural response to difficulties to do with
comparability is to shift to preorders, the response looks like one of the classic
candidate-solutions to the problem of vagueness. But superevaluationist approaches
have been heavily criticized (e.g. Williamson [84]). Furthermore, perhaps the par-
allel suggests that the basic problem with comparing different kinds of goods is one
of vagueness. In fact, cases in which evaluative comparisons look extremely difficult
seem to lend themselves to sorites paradoxes, one of the hallmarks of vagueness.
In one way this is good news: there is a vast amount of work on vagueness, so
ethicists have plenty of material to borrow from. Since the topic is probability, it
is worth mentioning that some treatments of vagueness are probabilistic, and that
an extensive literature takes this approach to vague comparatives; see e.g. Fish-
burn [13] for a survey. In another way it’s bad news: perhaps the main reason why
there is so much literature on vagueness is the almost complete lack of consensus.
Perhaps we ethicists should just shelve the problem of how best to model dif-
ficulties to do with evaluative comparisons until there is more convergence in the
literature on vagueness. However, in the absence of such convergence, it may still be
possible to achieve some kind of stability result: show that the solutions to a class
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of interesting ethical problems which involve goods which are difficult to compare
are insensitive to the resolution of more general problems about vagueness. For
example, Broome [5] takes this approach in his discussion of the neutral level for
existence. In section 16 I will suggest that the same can be done for the question
of what Harsanyi’s theorem really shows.
13. Nonexpected utility theory
The backbone of Harsanyi’s theorem is expected utility theory, but we have seen
a number of ways in which the claim that various evaluative relations satisfy the
expected utility axioms can be criticized. The axioms so far criticized are Strong
Independence, Ordering (insofar as completeness was criticized) and Continuity.
Some writers even go so far as to criticize transitivity (see e.g. Temkin [75]).
These criticisms are directly based either on distributive intuitions (Strong In-
dependence, Continuity), or on the nature of goods being distributed (Ordering).
But a serious question about the expected utility axioms arises from a different
direction.
Since the work of Allais [1] and Ellsberg [11], it has appeared to many that
individual preference relations violate the expected utility axioms in fairly system-
atic ways. The attempt to describe these violations has led to a huge body of
work developing alternatives to the expected utility axioms (for surveys, see e.g.
Schmidt [69], Sugden [74], Gilboa [16], and Wakker [81]).
This project has been accompanied by two broad views. One is that the alterna-
tive axioms simply help us catalogue human irrationality, which might of course be
very important in various descriptive and explanatory contexts. The other, often
prompted by the fact that the violations are often stable under criticism, is that
the support the alternative axioms tacitly enjoy genuinely threatens the picture of
rationality provided by expected utility theory.
Now these are views about rationality, whereas we have been interested in such
things as betterness and betterness for people. But the development of nonexpected
utility theory suggests that it would be interesting to modify distributive theories
which to varying extents involve the expected utility axioms by weakening those
axioms and then adding some of the nonexpected utility axioms.
If the application of the nonexpected utility axioms to such things as individual
betterness relations turns out to be reasonably well motivated, the result should be
an expanded account of reasonable distributive theories. But even if those axioms
are not well motivated when applied to evaluative relations, this project would still
be worth pursuing. If a class of popular distributive intuitions turns out to be
generated by such an application of nonexpected utility theory, we would in effect
have an important error theory.
14. Evaluative measures
Discussions of the ethics of distribution commonly assume the existence of quan-
titative measures of various evaluative properties, then use these measures to formu-
late various apparently natural ideas. For example, individual goodness measures,
quantitative measures of how good histories are for individuals, are often taken to
exist. Then assuming a constant population 1, . . . , n, it is often claimed that
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(U) According to utilitarianism, two histories are equally good if they contain the
same sum of individual goodness.
(E) According to egalitarianism, an equal distribution is better than an unequal
distribution of the same sum of individual goodness.
(P) According to the priority view, it is better to give a unit of individual goodness
to a worse off person than to a better off person.
These claims tacitly assume that talk of units of individual goodness is well-
defined. They are often taken to be (at least partial) definitions of the distributive
theories in question, making what seems natural or appealing about the theories in
question transparent. For more detail, McCarthy [42] examines the role of evalua-
tive measurement in common understandings of the priority view.
However, there are serious difficulties with this kind of approach to the ethics of
distribution. I will mention just one specific problem.
The only obvious fact about individual goodness measures is that they have to
represent risk-free individual betterness relations. But this only makes individual
goodness measures unique up to increasing transformation.16 But for units of indi-
vidual goodness to be well-defined, individual goodness measures must be unique
up to positive affine transformation. So to make them well-defined it looks as if
we need to make an arbitrary choice of measure (Broome [5]). But this will make
the theories partially defined by (U), (E) and (P) rest on an arbitrary choice, and
fail to vindicate the idea that they are the fundamental theories about the ethics
of distribution we take them to be.
More generally, taking the existence of quantitative evaluative measures as given,
then using them to theorize about the ethics of distribution, is strongly at variance
with standard views about measurement in the physical and social sciences. There,
quantitative measures are seen as emerging as canonical descriptions of qualitatively
described prior structures (see e.g. Krantz et al [34], Narens [52], Roberts [64]).
My own view is that we should treat evaluative measurement along the same lines.
By itself, this does not begin to settle what we should say about individual
goodness measures. But individual goodness measures turn out to be well-enough
defined for talk of units, sums, and so on to make sense, at least given certain
background assumptions.
I can only sketch this view, but in more detail, sections 9 and 10 point to a
characterization of egalitarianism and the priority view in terms of primitive qual-
itative relations (betterness, individual betterness). Similarly, I think the premises
of Harsanyi’s theorem should be understood as characterizing utilitarianism. Now
(U), (E) and (P) are close to platitudinous. But given these characterizations of
utilitarianism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, this means that we can treat (U),
(E) and (P) as implicit definitions of individual goodness measures. The result is
that individual goodness measures turn out to be the positive affine transformations
of u1, . . . , un, or what Broome [4] calls Bernoulli’s hypothesis. For details, see e.g.
McCarthy [44].
16I.e. if some function f represents the risk-free betterness relation, and g is some strictly
increasing function on the reals (x < y =⇒ g(x) < g(y)), then g ◦ f also represents the risk-free
betterness relation.
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The background assumptions are that individual betterness relations satisfy the
expected utility axioms and that interpersonal comparisons are unproblematic. But
what if these fail? I will not pursue this, for I think the most important lesson
about evaluative measures is not that they are arguably well-defined, but that it
does not much matter. We can and should theorize about the questions which really
matter in the ethics of distribution without using them. By focusing instead on
comparatives and various claims about probability, none of the distributive views
we have been discussed presuppose their existence, the preeminent example, of
course, being Harsanyi’s.
15. Aggregation
But this raises the question of what Harsanyi’s theorem really shows. Ethicists
often talk about the “problem of aggregation”. What they typically have in mind
is the task of somehow combining an assessment of what things are like for each
individual in a particular situation to form some sort of overall judgment of the
situation which enables us to make an evaluative comparison with other situations.
Supposing the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem are correct, it is tempting to
think that Harsanyi’s theorem solves the problem of aggregation. I believe this was
Harsanyi’s view, and I think it is popular among welfare economists. Harsanyi did
not use the terms ‘individual betterness relation’ and ‘betterness relation’, and I
stress that the following passage is mine, not his. But I think the following captures
the spirit of his view (see especially Harsanyi [23]).
Determining the content of individual preferences relations (de-
spite filtering out various irrationalities, excluding such things as
sadistic preferences, and requiring preferences to be rich enough
to enable interpersonal comparisons) is basically a psychological
matter (Harsanyi [23]; see also Rawls [62]). It does not involve any
significant evaluative or aggregative assumptions. But we should
identify individual betterness relations with individual preference
relations. Given the truth of Harsanyi’s premises, Harsanyi’s the-
orem then explicitly determines the extension of the betterness
relation. Problem of aggregation solved.
This position underplays the role of evaluative assumptions in determining the
content of individual betterness relations in at least two ways. First, determining
the content of individual preference relations may well involve prior evaluative as-
sumptions because of the role of such assumptions in popular accounts of radical
interpretation (e.g. Lewis [37]). Second, even when they are restricted to histories,
identifying individual betterness relations with individual preferences relations is
highly controversial. It is a major evaluative question whether to understand the
content of risk-free individual betterness relations in terms of preferences, the qual-
ity of the individual’s experiences, her achievements, or some combination thereof.
But suppose that evaluative question has been settled, and that Harsanyi’s
premises are true. The theorem certainly shows that figuring out the content of the
betterness relation is no harder than determining the content of individual better-
ness relations. But what exactly does it show about the problem of aggregation?
First, it is a vast exaggeration to say that the theorem solves the problem of
aggregation. Problems of aggregation arise whenever we have to make some sort
of assessment of a whole based on an assessment of its parts. But figuring out the
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content of individual betterness relations involves major questions of aggregation.
Even in the case in which all outcomes are equally likely, to assess whether facing
some lottery is better for someone than some particular outcome, we will have
to assess what each of the possible outcomes of the lottery are like for her, then
somehow aggregate to reach an overall assessment of the lottery. This problem is
complicated and is, in my view, much neglected. Like many economists, Harsanyi’s
own account tacitly appeals to the individual’s preferences. But this should not
seem very appealing to those of us who think that preference satisfaction accounts
are mistaken even for the question of when one outcome is better for an individual
than another.
Second, there is no logical reason why we cannot use the theorem to deduce the
content of individual betterness relations from the content of the betterness relation,
in particular from judgments about when one history is better than another. In
cases where we are very confident about the latter, this will even seem appealing. I
am afraid I lack the space to discuss this, but I think this idea provides a natural way
of interpreting various contractualist comments about veil of ignorance arguments
(see e.g. Scanlon [66] and Nagel [51]), in particular leading to an interesting case
for rejecting the claim that individual betterness relations satisfy Continuity.
More generally, if its premises are true, Harsanyi’s theorem teaches us that de-
termining the content of the betterness relation is easier than we may have thought.
But the flipside is that determining the content of individual betterness relations
is harder than many of us have assumed.
16. Summary on evaluation
When thinking about the ethics of distribution, it may seem that the real eval-
uative questions are about when one history is better than another, or better for
some individual. Factoring in probability may then seem like a basically technical
exercise, not one ethicists need be much concerned with.
Almost every topic discussed could easily have its own survey article. I have
had to omit many important positions, and give only sketchy defenses of positive
positions. Nevertheless, I have tried to make the case for the opposite view. Not
only are there very important ethical issues about how to rank lotteries, but these
directly bear on questions about when one history is better than another. I will
end the evaluative discussion with two opinions.
First, if I am right, almost every major position on the ethics of distribution is
essentially to do with probability. For example, assuming a constant population
1 . . . n, concerns with fairness, equality, and giving priority to the worse off as
characterized in sections 9 and 10 can each be shown to be consistent with the
popular idea that the risk-free betterness relation is represented by w◦u1+· · ·+w◦un
for some strictly increasing and strictly concave function w. These views only come
apart when probability is introduced. So one aspect of the importance of probability
is the increase in expressive power its introduction provides: it allows us to draw
distinctions which are difficult or impossible to draw in a risk-free framework.
Second, I think the various challenges to Harsanyi’s premises stemming from
appeals to equality, fairness, priority, and nonexpected utility theory fail. To be
sure, there is at least a reasonable case for rejecting Continuity, and Ordering (at
least, the completeness part of it) is under serious threat. Nevertheless, we can drop
Continuity and under many ways of modeling difficulties to do with comparability,
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what I take to be the core lesson of Harsanyi’s theorem remains stable:17 deter-
mining the content of individual betterness relations and determining the content
of the betterness relation are just different descriptions of the same problem. This
may help. Our initial judgments about individual betterness and about betterness
may be in tension with each other, and we may be more confident about some
judgments than others. Harmonizing these judgments in an attempt to achieve
reflective equilibrium may increase our confidence in the result.
17. Ought
Expected utility theory has turned out to be hugely important for developing a
taxonomy of answers to the fundamental evaluative question: when is one history
or lottery better than another? I have not emphasized this, but I also think that
the clarity of this taxonomy is also extremely helpful for assessing which answer is
correct. In the remaining space I only have room for one suggestion which, though
hardly very original, is that the same turns out to be true for decision theory and
the fundamental normative question: what ought we to do?
One immediate disclaimer is needed. Expected utility theory is usually under-
stood as a theory about the structure of the preferences of ideally rational agents.
But this chapter has discussed the application of expected utility theory to under-
standing evaluative comparatives without having to say anything about rationality.
Rather, many of the ideas and criticisms of expected utility theory are directly
applicable to questions about evaluative comparatives.
Similarly, decision theory is usually understood as an account of ideally rational
action, and it typically assume that the rationality of an action in some way depends
upon the agent’s preferences. However, we can apply many ideas from decision the-
ory directly to questions about the fundamental normative question without having
to presuppose some grand connection between rationality and ethics. For example,
it is a serious mistake to think that decision theory is going to be important to
ethics only if ethics is somehow about preference satisfaction, or if we hitch our-
selves to the unlikely project of deriving ethics from rationality. Thus the discussion
of decision theory in what follows is only meant to draw parallels between questions
about ethics and questions about rationality. Because the debates about rationality
are often better developed, these parallels may be illuminating. With no attempt
at exhaustiveness, the sequel will look briefly at three examples, with particular
emphasis on probability.
18. Act consequentialism
Given some account of betterness, the most obvious ethical theory is act con-
sequentialism: what we ought to do is to bring about the best available lottery.
If we assume for simplicity that the betterness relation satisfies the expected util-
ity axioms, act consequentialism then implies that there is some value function
such that we ought to perform the action with the greatest expected value. Thus
act consequentialism is the ethical theory which most obviously parallels decision
theory.
17In fact, this is true even if we weaken some of the EUT ideas in Harsanyi’s framework
and add various well-known nonEUT ideas. This is further pursued in McCarthy, Mikkola and
Thomas [46] and McCarthy [45].
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Act consequentialism is also one of the most criticized theories, one standard
criticism being that it has implausible implications. For example, assuming an
impartial method of valuation, Williams [83] argued that act consequentialism un-
dermines the partiality which for many people makes life worth living: devotion to
personal projects and particular people, often friends and family. But this raises
the question of what act consequentialism really requires in the first place.
Taking for granted a probability-based view which uses subjective probabilities,
or at least, probabilities which are relative to the evidence available to the agent,
Jackson [28] famously argued that because of facts about each individual’s probabil-
ities, act consequentialism will typically not require each agent to promote general
wellbeing and pursue whichever projects are the most impartially valuable. Rather,
it will require a typical agent – Alice, let’s call her – to promote the well-being of
the relatively small group of people Alice knows and cares about, and to adopt and
then pursue projects in which Alice takes a natural interest. This does not amount
to a rejection of impartial valuation, but instead reflects facts about each agent’s
limited information, the costs of deliberation and of acquiring new information, the
complexity of the interpersonal and intrapersonal coordination problems she faces,
the effects her actions will have on the expectations others will have of her future
behavior, her motivational strengths, and so on. Such facts will be encoded in
the agent’s probabilities, and will therefore affect which of her acts will maximize
expected value. Very often, Jackson argued, such acts will favour her nearest and
dearest.
Jackson’s argument was offered as a response to Williams, but it offers a much
more general lesson. Understanding what act consequentialism implies is going to
require sophisticated thinking about probability. The huge complexity of this prob-
lem stands in sharp contrast to the occasional complaint that act consequentialism
is simple-minded.
19. Rule consequentialism
Many writers, however, prefer rule consequentialism (or contractualism: at the
normative level, these views are often very similar). On the one hand, rule conse-
quentialism seems to fit better with common opinion about what we ought to do
than act consequentialism (it is said to secure rights etc.). On the other, it seems
to avoid the obscurities of deontology by resting its account of what we ought to
do on an appeal to what is good for people. But how is this achieved?
Harsanyi’s writings on rule utilitarianism offer a relatively clear answer. Simpli-
fying slightly, Harsanyi [25] claims that each member of a society of act utilitarians
will always maximize the sum of expected individual utilities where the calculation
is based on her subjective probabilities of what the other members are going to do.
Each member of a society of rule utilitarians is committed to and thus will always
act upon the rule R which is such that if everyone acts according to R expected
utility will be greater than if everyone acts according to some other rule (I ignore
the possibility that two rules could be tied). Harsanyi claims that rule utilitari-
anism will lead to “incomparably superior” overall results in comparison with act
utilitarianism because of its superiority in two kinds of scenarios: (i) in certain
simultaneous coordination games (e.g. choosing whether to vote), and (ii) in cer-
tain sequential games (typically involving choices about respecting rights, keeping
promises etc.). This superiority is despite the fact that R will sometimes tell agents
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to perform actions which they are certain will produce suboptimal results, where
optimality is understood in terms of maximizing the sum of expected utilities. This
last feature leads many to suspect that there is something unstable about rule util-
itarianism, but Harsanyi claims that these superior overall results imply that rule
utilitarianism is correct.
It would take a separate article even to outline the important issues here, and I
merely want to make three points to illustrate the potential value of looking at this
style of argument through the lens of contemporary debates about decision theory.
To do that, I will assume for the sake of argument (though this is far from obvious)
that Harsanyi is right about the superior overall results of rule utilitarianism in
comparison with act utilitarianism.
First, Harsanyi stresses that the rule utilitarians take themselves to be facing
a problem involving complete probabilistic dependence: each will commit to (and
thus act on) rule R if and only if all commit to R. In this respect, rule utilitarians
are like the well known case of clones playing a prisoner’s dilemma. It is this
probabilistic dependence which leads to rule utilitarianism’s superior performance
in the coordination games. However, in these coordination games, there is causal
independence between the actions of each player. But “probabilistic dependence yet
causal independence” takes us to a crucial issue in decision theory. Very roughly,
so-called evidential decision theory assesses (the rationality of) actions in terms of
how likely good outcomes are conditional upon the actions being performed. By
contrast, causal decision theory assesses actions in terms of their causal tendency to
produce good outcomes. The classic case in which the two come apart is Newcomb’s
problem. However, for those of us who think that Newcomb’s problem teaches us
to be causal decision theorists (see e.g. Joyce [31], and in this volume, Buchak [6]),
probabilistic dependence is a red herring when there is causal independence, as
there plainly is in Harsanyi’s simultaneous coordination games. So we may think
that Harsanyi has tacitly built something like evidential decision theory into rule
utilitarianism, and so much the worse for rule utilitarianism.
Second, the success of rule utilitarianism in various sequential games stems from
the rule utilitarians’ commitment to the rule R even in contexts in which acting on
R leads to suboptimal results. The conclusion that in virtue of this success, rule
utilitarianism is right about what we ought to do is parallel to a revision to standard
decision theory later urged by by Gauthier [15] and McLennan [48]. This revision
claims that if it is rational at time t to become committed to performing some
action at a later time t′ which is obviously irrational when considered in isolation,
it is rational to commit to the action and then later perform that action. But those
of us who take the toxin puzzle of Kavka [33] to dramatize why this revision is
mistaken may think that rule utilitarianism is making the same kind of mistake.
Third, Harsanyi’s characterization of act versus rule utilitarianism parallels the
influential distinction in von Neumann and Morgenstern [80] between games against
nature and games against other people. Each act utilitarian will have probabilities
about a number of relevant variables, and will maximize expected value accordingly.
The fact that some of these variables are the behavior of other people who like
herself are act utilitarians is neither here nor there; the decision theoretic model
still applies. But when an agent is in a situation in which the outcome depends in
part on the behavior of agents just like her, von Neumann and Morgenstern argued
that decision theory is inappropriate. The problem of self-reference embedded into
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such situations requires the different tools of game theory, and Harsanyi’s rule
utilitarians reason along similar lines. Perhaps von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
argument could be used to bolster Harsanyi’s approach. Alternatively, those of us
who are convinced by Skyrms [73] in thinking that problems of self-reference can
and should be handled without having to abandon decision theory may think this
points to a further difficulty for rule utilitarianism.
Of course, the fact that Harsanyi focussed on rule utilitarianism rather than rule
consequentialism has been inessential to the discussion. These crude and prelimi-
nary remarks are only meant to suggest the value of looking at the foundations of
rule consequentialism through the lens of parallel and often much more extensive
debates about decision theory.
20. Deontology
Those with strong deontological intuitions may reject rule consequentialism, ei-
ther because they are not convinced that it is a stable alternative to act consequen-
tialism, or because its conclusions are not deontological enough. But we may now
seem to have reached the limits of the usefulness of thinking about decision theory.
Very roughly, anything like a decision theoretic approach to deontology looks like
the wrong model: the former is all about weighing goods against evils, and the lat-
ter thinks there circumstances in which such weighing is illegitimate, or counts for
nothing. Nevertheless, one lesson from thinking about probability is that weighing
is not so easy to avoid.
In trying to characterize a deontological view, there seem to be two basic op-
tions. What I will call agent-centered views typically prohibit actions which would
involve the agent’s mental states bearing some kind of inappropriate relation to
the outcome. The most obvious example is the so-called principle of double effect,
which in its simplest form prohibits bringing about intended harm, but permits
certain otherwise identical cases of bringing about merely foreseen harm. What
I will call causal structure views typically prohibit actions which stand in some
kind of inappropriate causal relation to the outcome. For example, in the famous
trolley problem, an out of control trolley is going to kill five people who are stuck
on the track, but a bystander can switch the trolley to a sidetrack where it will
kill one person. Many people who have strong deontological intuitions think it is
permissible to switch the trolley. But in most cases, they think that killing one
to save five is impermissible, as in the variant where the bystander can push a fat
man off a bridge to stop the trolley (Thomson [76]), killing him but saving the five.
Causal structure theorists think the intentions of the bystander are irrelevant, and
search for differences in the causal structure of the cases to explain the difference
in permissibility.
Many deontologists have not had much sympathy for agent-centered views, and
have preferred some kind of causal structure view (e.g. Kamm [32]). But here is
what I believe is a relatively neglected problem about such views. If the inappro-
priate causal relation is between the action and the outcome – as in, e.g. the fat
man variant but not the trolley problem itself – then prima facie, there are going
to be actions which bring about the following lotteries: some benefit occurs with
nonzero probability p, some inappropriate causal structure obtains with probability
1 − p. For example, driving a truck across the bridge will either miss the fat man
30 DAVID MCCARTHY
and deliver aid elsewhere, or else hit him and topple him off the bridge, stopping
the trolley and saving the five.
What should causal structure deontologists say about such actions? There are
at least five responses. (i) All such actions are impermissible. Objection: this
leads to an intolerably restrictive view. (ii) Such actions are impermissible if and
only if they turn out to result in the inappropriate causal structure. Objection:
similar to the objections to outcome-based views in section 2. (iii) Actions which
lead to the inappropriate causal structure with probability one are impermissible, all
others are permissible. Objection: it is not credible that there should be such a gulf
between probability one and probabilities just less than one. (iv) Actions performed
by agents whose reasons for performing them include the benefits resulting from
the inappropriate structure are impermissible. Objection: this collapses causal
structure views into agent-centered views. (v) Actions are impermissible if and
only if p exceeds some intermediate probability threshold. Objection: this seems
to be the most principled response for a causal structure view, but it suggests the
acceptability of weighing the alleged badness of the causal structure against the
production of benefits. This seems to fit poorly with the guiding deontological
image of the inappropriateness of weighing when inappropriate causal structures
are concerned.
Perhaps this kind of case points towards a serious problem for causal structure
views; see further Jackson and Smith [29]. Or it may provide an opportunity
for causal structure theorists to refine their views. Either way, thinking about
probability and deontology seems helpful.
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